THE New Republic

Lincoln and "Massive Resistance"

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The Death Wish Of the Democrats

The Meaning of Thomas K. Finletter's Defeat

By ARTHUR SCHLESINGER, JR.

Negotiating With the Russians—II . . *Michael Lindsay*

Marquis Childs' Eisenhower . . . . *Richard L. Strout*

Up in Central Park . . . . . *Frank Getlein*

LOUIS J. HALLE

Waiting for Disaster—Our China Policy

SEPTEMBER 15, 1958

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Washington Wire

The Permanent Brink

WILL THERE BE WAR over Quemoy? No; we guess not. The Administration has everything to lose by it since it would be the most unpopular war in US history; the Reds have nothing to gain since the situation is perfect for them as it stands. They have us over a barrel. They can start paddling again anytime they want.

Eisenhower-Dulles have created a long-range, built-in, permanent brink, and lost control of it. How did it happen? Too many blank checks. Eisenhower signed a blank check for Chiang Kai-shek, who of course has everything to gain by war. (How well I remember watching from the press gallery the wild, adoring Republican enthusiasm in the joint session when newly-elected Eisenhower with simple majesty announced he was "unleashing" the 7th Fleet!) Later, January 25, 1955, the House signed a blank check for Eisenhower, 410-3, and the Senate, three days later, 85-3, giving him a free hand in Formosa — to use atom bombs if he wanted.

(The extraordinary Congressional "blank checks" flowed naturally from the decay of a real opposition which, in turn, followed from the influence of the one-party press and the nation's worship of the father image of a Hero-President.)

So there we are. War? Probably not! We could be mistaken of course, but young men of draft age (and parents) don't have to bother their heads about it anyway because the decision is all up to Dulles-Eisenhower.

The Reds will use the situation to further scare our already thoroughly-frightened Allies. They know we can't play off Moscow against Peking as they play us off against London, Paris and Bonn because we are too haughty even to recognize Red China's existence.

We have an extraordinary incident to report to the Society for the Investigation of Psychic Phenomena. At Newport, R. I., last week, Secretary Dulles was telling the press that the new Eisenhower statement on Quemoy either did or didn't mean we would fight. And then it happened!

Right before our eyes Mr. Dulles disappeared. In his place there stood a "high ranking American official." His resemblance to Dulles was really extraordinary. You might have sworn it was the same man. Observers noted, however, that the voice was considerably stronger and more confident and the statement much more positive that US soldiers would be sent to aid Chiang if he couldn't hold Quemoy. Newsmen with a sense of the supernatural were awed and exhilarated at the sight, which was surely one of the best attested examples of transubstantiation on record.

Eisenhower dealt GOP Senator Frederick Payne of Maine a cruel blow just before the election. As though Payne's receipt of Goldfine gifts wasn't a bad enough handicap, Eisenhower vetoed the Federal aid for depressed areas bill which Payne and Senator Douglas had co-sponsored, calling its provisions "unsound" and a "grave mistake." The bill was Payne's big election talking point in areas of chronic unemployment.

Election Prospects

THE MID-TERM battle is now in full swing. Here are some prospects. Earlier rosy Democratic hopes have faded somewhat. The party is still expected to win 10 to 30 House seats. (A Quemoy war could raise this to 100.) These seats will be mostly "liberal." The South has all it can get now—new Democratic members will be mostly from big cities. They could be crucial for the next two years. Bills like aid to housing, education and the like were defeated by narrow GOP-Southern conservative coalitions: Thirty more liberal, city Democratic votes would tip the balance, restore genuine 2-party government.

The two elements that don't want this to happen are the GOP leadership and much of the Democratic leadership. Conservative Democrats fear the "wild men" (*i.e.*, liberals) this election may bring. In the Senate a few more liberal Senators (plus two from Alaska) might tip the balance in the big new fight ahead to end filibusters.

Another point. The Democratic civil rights split won't mean much in the local mid-term contests. But it will show up and probably defeat the party in 1960.

This commentator would as of now expect Mr. Nixon to win because he anticipates the Democrats will follow "traditional" patterns. This involves nominating an "available" candidate (say Governor Meyner of New Jersey), eschewing resolute liberals (like Governor Mennen Williams, or Senator Hubert Humphrey) and conciliating the South (*i.e.*, hanging the segregation albatross round their necks.) This gives Nixon (the almost-certain GOP nominee) every advantage. Harry Truman in '48 showed the Democrats can win without the South; the circumstances are now such that it is doubtful whether the party can win with it (assuming that this means nominating a "compromise" candidate).

Built-in Obsolescence

THE 1958 RECESSION was a Detroit recession: the haughty auto tycoons designed cars the public wouldn't stomach. Consequent unemployment spread out from there. Now the new models are unveiled. Smaller, cheaper, more compact? On the contrary—longer, flashier, more expensive. The '59 models were designed two years ago and Detroit is stuck with them. So go out and buy one of the new cars, sucker. Billions in advertising will tell you to do it. Forget your own tastes; what is good for General Motors is good for you. That flashy chrome gimmick that makes you buy the car is the "built-in obsolescence" that Detroit will leave off next year, making your car a contemptible has-been. Of course you can always buy an economical imported car. But there are signs alarmed Detroit is leveling advertising guns against these, too, as alleged "traffic hazards." Alas, if the new models really are a flop Detroit may succeed in prolonging the recession.

T.R.B.

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Lincoln and Faubus

IT SEEMS that Mr. Lincoln has been drafted into the ranks of those who offer "massive resistance" to the Supreme Court's school integration decision.

That the segregationists should claim Lincoln is startling but understandable. Support among live Northern politicians for the policy of "massive resistance" is scarce. Of necessity, the segregationists are nothing if not historically-minded. And there is some evidence which, if one is careful to look at it only once and then very quickly, tends to make a plausible case for them. What is truly surprising is that such a newspaper as the *Washington Post and Times-Herald* should undertake, in a long and ponderous editorial, to concede Mr. Lincoln to the other side, albeit ruefully. The matter is worth comment not only because Lincoln's name is worth fighting for, but because to concede him is to misunderstand his position. And to mistake Lincoln's position in 1858 is to mistake the position of the Supreme Court today.

Lincoln, the Republican Party, and, as it turned out, a majority of the nation were opposed to the Supreme Court's Dred Scott decision in 1857. In that case, the court held that Dred Scott, a slave, did not gain his freedom when his master took him from a slave state into free territory. The court decreed that Scott was still the property of his master. It proceeded also, unnecessarily, to deliver itself of the doctrine that Congress lacked the power to prohibit slavery in any territory.

In the course of his famous debates with Stephen A. Douglas in 1858, Lincoln, as the *Post* thoughtfully reminds its readers, said he was against this decision, that he thought it wrong, that he feared its consequences, that he deemed it altogether deplorable. Douglas, on the other hand, without admitting that he necessarily thought it right, dwelt heavily on the argument that "whoever resists the final decision of the highest judicial tribunal aims a deadly blow at our whole republican system of government." To this Lincoln countered by deriding the notion that a decision of the Supreme Court is a "thus saith the Lord." The Court, he said, can be wrong. There is nothing sacred about the Court's decisions. Men may properly differ with them.

On the basis of such statements, it is concluded that Lincoln did not consider the Dred Scott decision to be the law of the land; he felt free to resist it; and that just so Governor Faubus and Senator Byrd and their adherents may feel free to resist the integration ruling.

But Lincoln repeatedly took the trouble to point out that he and his party opposed the Dred Scott decision only in "a certain way." And he said explicitly: "We offer no resistance to it," which he fully meant. For Lincoln, needless to say, had a subtle and sophisticated conception of the American form of government. Not for him the simplicities that Stephen A. Douglas, who knew better, pressed on him for political advantage, that a Senator Byrd, who also knows better, urges today, and that the editorial writer of

Correspondence

► ***Passion—Moral and Otherwise***

SIRS:

AS MR. ROSS' outburst of "Passion—Moral and Otherwise" (*NR*, August 18) has little to do with me (or with Mary McCarthy), I'm not sure that I am called upon to deal with it. However,

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the *Post* had regretfully felt obliged to swallow.

Perhaps the clearest summary of Lincoln's position is to be found in his speech at Quincy, toward the end of the debates with Douglas. Lincoln said:

> We do not propose that when Dred Scott has been decided to be a slave by the court, we, as a mob, will decide him to be free. We do not propose that, when any other one, or one thousand, shall be decided by that court to be slaves, we will in any violent way disturb the rights of property so settled; but we nevertheless do oppose that decision as a political rule which shall be binding on the voter, to vote for nobody who thinks it wrong, which shall be binding on the members of Congress or the President to favor no measure that does not actually concur with the principles of that decision. . . . We propose so resisting it as to have it reversed if we can, and a new judicial rule established upon this subject.
>
> I will add this, that . . . if there be any man in the Republican Party who . . . is impatient of the constitutional guarantees thrown around [slavery], and would act in disregard of these [*i.e.* in disregard of the Dred Scott decision], he . . . is misplaced standing with us . . . for we have a due regard . . . for all these things.

Earlier, at Chicago, in July, Lincoln had gone as far as he ever did. "If I were in Congress," he said, "and a vote should come up on a question whether slavery should be prohibited in a new territory, in spite of that Dred Scott decision, I would vote that it should." But he said in the same breath: "I do not resist it . . . all that I am doing is refusing to obey it as a political rule." And at Springfield the same month: "By resisting it as a political rule, I disturb no right of property, create no disorder, excite no mobs." And further at Chicago:

> What are the uses of decisions of courts? . . . First—they decide upon the question before the court. They decide in this case that Dred Scott is a slave. Nobody resists that. Not only that, but they say to everybody else, that persons standing just as Dred Scott stands are as he is. That is, they say that when a question comes up upon another person it will be so decided again, unless the court decides in another way, unless the court overrules its decision. Well, we mean to do what we can to have the court decide the other way.

How then does Lincoln "lend comfort," as the *Post* thought, to Mr. Byrd and Mr. Faubus and the rest? And how does he affirm, as David Lawrence recently cited him to affirm, that the Supreme Court's decisions "are not national policies," in the sense in which counsel for the Little Rock School Board had used the phrase in a colloquy with Mr. Justice Frankfurter—that is, are not law?

Following Lincoln, we may say that the uses of the Court's integration decision and of the lower-court decrees that have followed it are, first, that they decide that certain children must be admitted to certain schools, and second, that other children standing just as they stand are as they are, and will be similarly treated, unless the Court overrules itself. To this, following Lincoln, Southern leaders may offer no resistance. But they do. They may not "as a mob" decide otherwise. But they do.

Anyone taking Lincoln for his example may decline to obey the Court's decision as a political rule. He may deplore it and argue against it to his heart's delight. He may hope to convert public opinion. He may vote for laws that fail to advance and that even fail to concur with its principles. He may refuse to consider the issue settled and relitigate it at every opportunity that the established judicial process offers him, and it offers quite a few. If he succeeds in turning public opinion, he may realistically look to the day when the Court will reverse itself, as it has, expressly or by indirection, done on other issues in the past. But until that day, the decision is law and it is national policy, in accordance with "the uses of decisions of courts," and nobody can cite Lincoln as authority for resisting its enforcement. Quite the contrary.

The difficulty of course is that Lincoln was confident he could turn public opinion, whereas the resisters of today say what they will, know that they cannot. They know that this time the Court's result is, as Attorney General Rogers said recently in Los Angeles, "undoubtedly permanent . . . , the law of the land for today, tomorrow and, I am convinced, for the future—for all regions and for all people." And the reason why segregation will not last cannot be stated better than in words Lincoln used about slavery:

> I hate it because it deprives our republican example of its just influence in the world—enables the enemies of free institutions, with plausibility, to taunt us as hypocrites—causes the real friends of freedom to doubt our sincerity, and especially because it forces so many really good men amongst ourselves into an open war with the very principles of civil liberty. . . .

We Like To Be Helpful

PRESIDENT EISENHOWER, whose administration has succeeded in leading us into a deficit expected to increase the national debt in one year by more than half the amount that the New Deal increased it in six—twelve billions as against twenty—has announced that his principal issue in the coming campaign will be the elimination of deficits.

Perhaps he would like a text for his preachments, and if so we are happy to oblige. Here is one peculiarly suited both to his subject and to his temperament; it reads:

> Annual income twenty pounds, annual expenditure nineteen nineteen six, result happiness. Annual income twenty pounds, annual expenditure twenty pounds ought and six, result misery.

The source is that celebrated and bankrupt fiscal ex-

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pert, Mr. Wilkins Micawber, antecedent to Mr. Eisenhower not only in his financial wisdom, but also in the policy of never doing anything in the happy expectation that "something will turn up."

Behind A Strike

IF THE STALEMATE between the United Auto Workers and the automotive Big Three leads to a strike—and the chances for a strike are at least even—the motives of both sides will to some extent appear suspect. The close and quite public link between auto company officials and Michigan Republicanism makes it plausible indeed that the companies are not unaware of the political advantages in a strike at this particular time. A strike in Detroit this fall would focus attention on labor—and Walter Reuther—for GOP Congressional campaigning, strengthening GOP contentions that the cost-of-living can be charged up to strike-enforced wage increases. But the UAW leadership, too, would be resorting to a strike for internal political reasons of its own. The union's bargaining position has improved with the switchover to the '59 models; the UAW is not likely, however, to win much in the way of the wage increases and pension benefits it is seeking and a strike would in part be a gesture to satisfy the rank-and-file that what has been gained as a settlement is in fact the most that can be gained.

For a strike to be avoided the UAW leadership would have to conclude that the rank-and-file is cool to a strike and will settle for what comes off the bargaining table. And for this to happen, in turn, management must put something reasonable on the bargaining table in the first place. After the initial injury of a proposal for a straight two-year contract extension—delivered in common by Chrysler, Ford and General Motors—Chrysler added its own calculated insult by insisting on measures designed to weaken the UAW's plant-steward bargaining network. The companies' refusal so far to agree to any improved benefits for Michigan's quarter-million auto industry unemployed has especially galled the UAW in view of the fact that both supplementary unemployment plans and pension trusts in the industry are amply funded at present for needed programs.

The Race Riots in Britain

London

FOR the first time in history the British people have seen the obscene terror of race riots in their own homeland. Negro-baiting mobs have stormed through the streets of Nottingham and Notting Hill—a poor part of London—shouting for lynchings and blood. So far no one has been killed. But the local hospitals have had dozens of wounded to treat, and the police courts have been full of rioters.

In each of the cities concerned the trouble was started by small groups of "teddy boys"—young delinquents—who would probably have been beating up other white people if they had not decided to pick on the colored for a change. But once the fighting began the mob was swollen by half-drunken men and women from the Saturday night public houses, and a race riot of the classical type was under way. There is no doubt that the way the press and television treated the first outbreak at Nottingham was partly responsible for later incidents—indeed on one occasion everything was quiet, until a cameraman lit a magnesium flare to film a mock-fight between two groups who had been coached for the performance. But the fact that such provocation could produce the appalling results which followed shows that the situation is explosive.

There are still only about 200,000 colored people living in Britain at present. Half are West Indians and a quarter from India and Pakistan. Most of the rest are from West Africa. But nearly all have come to live in England since World War II, and they have settled in a few small parts of a few cities—notably London, Sheffield, Birmingham and other Midland towns like Nottingham. What has stimulated immigration (now at about 40,000 a year) is the existence of full employment and the welfare state in Britain at a time when growing overpopulation is forcing down the living standards in so many British colonies. Moreover though an inhabitant of Jamaica is forbidden to settle in many of the other West Indian territories, he is free to settle in England and to enjoy immediately the high level of National Assistance and medical treatment under the National Health Service.

A MAIN CAUSE of the current racial troubles has been sexual jealousy—particularly in places like Nottingham where there is a shortage of colored women and of white men. Moreover there have been cases, always well publicized, of colored men living on the earnings of white prostitutes. But it is generally believed that economic factors are the decisive element. Part-time work and unemployment have increased considerably in the last year or two, and all too often a white worker who has lost his job will not tolerate the existence of a black worker who has one. There is now a growing demand—in both the political parties—to establish some control on colored immigration. It is easy to justify some control, but against the background of race riots, any form of control may easily appear as the product of color prejudice.

The only good result of the racial tension is to prove to the more pharisaical British that color prejudice is not exclusively an American or South African phenomenon.

DENIS HEALEY, M.P.

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The Two Worlds of Numidia

Constantine

YOU CAN live in Algiers, in Oran, or in Bone, and be under the impression that you are living in a suburb of Marseille or of Barcelona. But in Constantine it is impossible not to know immediately that you are in Africa, for here the Moslems are everywhere. They are there as you walk out of your hotel—little barefooted urchins waiting to ambush you with their shoeshine boxes in a pathetic effort to earn a few extra francs, stoop-shouldered drivers in rickety carts egging on their emaciated nags, furtive women veiled in shrouds of funereal black, yellow turbaned elders with wizened faces and knobbly canes, men whom the hot African sun has prematurely aged and withered, like wrinkled prunes, and who eke out a listless existence in watchful silence or in guttural discourse on park benches.

This omnipresent impression of idle aimlessness is enough to puncture any hollow rhetoric about the "nine million Frenchmen of Algeria" or the "fraternization of souls." For what effective community can exist between these listless observers and the bustling Europeans that pass before them on the streets? They belong to two different worlds, or rather, the first are exiles in a world which the second have transformed. In 1954 Constantine was a city of some 80,000 people; today it numbers 140,000. The additional 60,000 are for the most part Moslem refugees from the fellaga-infested hills who have sought refuge in the city and who today find themselves condemned to live in some 25 different *bidonvilles* ("tin can towns") that look more like abandoned car lots than human dwelling places. Since Constantine has little industry, there is not much these hapless souls can do in the daytime but sit and starve.

This is as good a place as any to observe that grim process of *clochardisation* (pauperization) which Germaine Tillion has so penetratingly analyzed in her book, *Algeria—1957*. The gleaming new apartment buildings going up on the outskirts of Constantine—they even include a 15-story "skyscraper"—attest the growing wealth of its European inhabitants. Meanwhile, the unemployed slum-dwellers of the *bidonvilles* are poorer than they were before.

The hard-pressed officers in the army's *Section Administrative Urbaine* who have the thankless task of taking care of these miserable wretches have no illusions on this score. They realize only too well that granting the vote to a kind of half-starved sub-proletariat is not a valid substitute for work or bread. But as long as there is no industry in Constantine there is little they can do to bridge the immense social gap thus created between Europeans and Moslems.

Such is not the case for the second major gap separating the two communities—that between the status of European and Moslem women—and yet here too one gets the impression of a fateful impasse. There is a touching sincerity in the efforts that the wives of generals and of other French notables have made to break down the previous barriers that separated European from Moslem women by organizing women's clubs and feminine gatherings. But social intercourse is not easy between the cultivated wife of a French officer and a Moslem lady who may, as often as not, never have read a book. Glad as she may be to doff the veil within the walls of the feminine sanctuary prepared for the occasion, she instinctively dons it again when she steps back into the street. The attempt that was made last June to organize a mass unveiling of Moslem womanhood was here in Constantine a spectacular failure. To impress General de Gaulle and his entourage during their visit to the city, the local authorities got hold of a fully emancipated Moslem girl who had never worn a veil in her life and persuaded her to put one on for the occasion and to rip it off in public with dramatic *éclat*. She consented to do so in return for the promised liberation of her half-brother, who had been arrested shortly before, but no one was taken in by the meaningless ritual.

IN 1926, WHEN Kemal Ataturk granted Turkish women the vote, he simultaneously outlawed the veil. It is a characteristic paradox of present French policy in Algeria that they have not dared go as far or as fast as the dictatorial Westernizer of Ankara. Thus the Moslem woman of Algeria now finds herself possessed of certain political rights at a time when she is still socially enslaved. This is in the nature of things a curious state of affairs. If we further recall that some 95 percent of the Moslem women in Algeria are illiterate (the ratio for the men is around 80 percent), we can appreciate the immense gamble involved in the forthcoming elections in Algeria. As a general rule, political emancipation in the West has followed in the wake of social emancipation, but here in Algeria, the reverse is taking place. Inevitably it raises the disturbing question as to whether elections held in such conditions can be more than a symbolic shadow-play of the genuine democratic process.

CURTIS CATE

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Death Wish of the Democrats

by ARTHUR SCHLESINGER, JR.

RECENT EVENTS in Connecticut, in Pennsylvania and now in New York are bound to disturb liberal and independent voters who have come in the last generation to regard the Democratic Party as a reliable guardian of their interests. I refer to the choice of Thomas J. Dodd over Chester Bowles and William Benton for the Democratic senatorial nomination in Connecticut, to the choice of David Lawrence over Richardson Dilworth for the Democratic gubernatorial nomination in Pennsylvania, and most recently and shockingly to the choice of Frank Hogan over Thomas K. Finletter for the Democratic senatorial nomination in New York.

These events form an evident pattern. Few people in our day and nation would have been more superbly qualified for the Senate than Finletter, Bowles and Benton. Yet in states as presumably mature politically as New York and Connecticut, the Democratic organization preferred to nominate mediocre party hacks. The case in Pennsylvania is less clearcut, since Mayor Lawrence is as thoroughly qualified for the governorship as Messrs. Hogan and Dodd are not for the Senate; yet the elimination of Dilworth too seems part of the broader pattern. The essence of this pattern is plain enough. It is a revolt of the low-level professional within the party organization against the New Deal and post-New Deal leadership of the Democratic Party. If it continues, it will transform the character of the party and destroy its prospects.

I suggest that this revolt began on the lower levels. I doubt whether Carmine De Sapio, the party boss in New York, or John Bailey, the state chairman in Connecticut, would have incited these uprisings. In a sense, they too are among the victims. Both De Sapio and Bailey have been relatively "modern" politicians, liberal in their public utterances, willing in the past to work cheerfully with the Harrimans and Bowleses. But both are evidently weak men, frightened by rumblings from the local clubs and disinclined to fight for the principles they so fervently espouse on ceremonial occasions. Congressman William Green, the boss in Philadelphia, is another matter; he is the Know-Nothing revolt incarnate. But whether slowly, as with De Sapio and Bailey, or joyfully, as with Green, the state leaders in the Northeast have begun a process of capitulation to the Know-Nothing elements in the lower rungs of the party organization. In a state like Massachusetts, with a hopelessly evasive and mediocre governor like Foster Furcolo, and with Senator Kennedy understandably but regrettably staying out of local politics, the process of decay is even further advanced; able young liberal Democrats encounter an automatic resentment in the lower ranks of the organization when they bear reprehensible names like Endicott Peabody or John L. Saltonstall, Jr.

What is the essence of this Know-Nothing revolt? Leo Egan in an interesting piece in the *New York Times* after the rejection of Finletter suggested that it was "a deliberate decision to limit the growing power of the party's 'eggheads'." The organization thesis, he wrote, "is that the 'eggheads'—the intellectuals and crusading New Deal elements within the Democratic Party as well as the Liberal Party—were exercising an influence over party policies beyond their strength." This anti-egghead-ism is certainly part of the story. Another part of the story is an anti-Ivy League feeling which has been rankling for many years in the murky lower depths of the Democratic Party in the Northeast. Most of these state parties are a curious amalgamation of upper-class figures, Yankee, Protestant, college-trained, much concerned about political principle and public service—sometimes airy in their attitude toward the shabbier political realities—and lower-class professionals, Irish or Italian by origin, Catholic by religion, for whom politics is not a sometime avocation or a form of ideological combat but a business and a way of life. Often this background has produced some of the wisest and ablest leaders in the party, as often the upper-class amateurs are dilettantes. In any case, tensions exist between them.

FOR a time bosses like Jacob Arvey in Illinois and Paul Dever in Massachusetts, like (to a degree) Bailey and De Sapio—like, most effectively of all, Jim Finnegan in Pennsylvania, whose death seems more than ever a calamitous loss to the Democratic Party—succeeded in bridging the gap between the two antagonistic groups. But the links appear to be snapping. No one should underestimate the intensity of the feeling. Tom Finletter's defeat in Buffalo was the New York County organiza-

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tion's revenge against the Lexington Democratic Club.

The essence of the Know-Nothing revolt, in short, is to wipe out the transformation wrought in the Democratic Party by Franklin Roosevelt and the New Deal and to recreate something like the Democratic Party of the twenties. That party was a dreary alliance of Northern city bosses and Southern Bourbons—a party in which the Ivy League and intellectual elements played a wholly decorative role. It was a party without ideas, program, energy or zeal. Its ceiling was Governor Alfred E. Smith of New York. Smith was, of course, a great state governor, and in 1928 even he proved too much for the pre-Roosevelt Democratic Party. Smith's subsequent moral and intellectual collapse when confronted by the national issues of the thirties showed the feebleness of even the best of the party whose nominee he was in 1928.

THE KEY to the transformation was Franklin Roosevelt, whom Al Smith dismissed with condescension as an amiable front man for "real" Democrats like himself. Roosevelt brought the intellectual and Ivy League elements into the center of the party. One recalls Smith's bewildered complaint in 1936: "Who is Ickes? Who is Wallace? Who is Hopkins, and, in the name of all that is good and holy, who is Tugwell, and where did he blow from? . . . Is LaGuardia a Democrat? If he is, then I am a Chinaman with a haircut." The New Dealers may not have been, in Smith's terms, as good Democrats as himself, Joseph B. Ely, Daniel F. Cohalan, James Reed and Bainbridge Colby—the men who demanded in 1936 that the Democratic Party purge itself of the New Deal. But the New Dealers were the men whose readiness to confront a bitter economic and social challenge restored potency to the Democratic Party. If Smith and his policies had won out, the Democratic Party would be as dead as the Whigs. The shortest definition of the men who are choosing senatorial candidates is that they instinctively regard Smith, Ely and Cohalan as truer Democrats than Franklin Roosevelt.

Such men pride themselves on their political "realism." It is their stock in trade in back-room discussions: if they don't have this, then they have nothing. In fact, they could hardly be greater romantics. They disregard, for example, the growing importance demonstrated in every recent election of the independent and the switch voter: in New York, a Finletter could appeal to large sectors of the electorate which a Hogan can never hope to reach. More than this, they forget that the Democratic Party has been nationally successful only as a great coalition in which intellectuals play a central role.

That was true of Jefferson and Jackson. It was true of Grover Cleveland, with his "mugwump" following, and of Woodrow Wilson, fresh from the campus of Princeton. It was true of Franklin Roosevelt and Harry Truman. Men like De Sapio and Bailey ought to know that the Democratic Party will never succeed in terms of Alton B. Parker and John W. Davis—or of Thomas J. Dodd and Frank Hogan.

The pat dismissal by the bosses of the intellectuals and Ivy Leaguers—"How many votes do they have?"—is about as intelligent as Stalin's "How many divisions has the Pope?" No doubt the men who thought up the Social Security Act, the Wages and Hours Act and the rest of the New Deal had no more than two score votes to cast between them. But their ideas and achievements brought the Democratic Party millions of votes and kept it in power for a generation. The Dodds and Hogans simply cannot elicit this sort of contribution nor command this sort of support. We will be told that they will vote right on specific bills. But liberalism is more than voting the way the party leadership says; it implies intellectual curiosity, moral passion and a creative approach to public policy. The suppression of creativity will deprive the Democratic Party of the intellectual and moral élan which has been the source of its strength. The pros should never forget that, if the great natural resource of the Republican Party is money, the great natural resource of the Democratic Party is brains. De Sapio turning down Finletter is as bright as Meade Alcorn turning down a million dollars.

Some Democrats have not forgotten this. In this respect, the party must be grateful to its senatorial leadership. Hubert Humphrey, John F. Kennedy, Joseph Clark, Paul Douglas, yes, and Lyndon Johnson too —these men and many of their colleagues, however one may fault them in detail, stand plainly in their political style and purpose against the Know-Nothing revolt. But the fact of senatorial wisdom should not induce complacency. State organizations are far more powerful than senators in national conventions. The rejection of Finletter and the others contains dismal portents which may well decide the outcome of the 1960 Presidential election.

WHAT makes this Democratic turn the more ironic is that it comes at a time when the rest of the nation is belatedly awakening to the desperate need for new ideas, for intelligence, for leadership in our public life. Men like Tom Finletter, Chester Bowles, William Benton, Richardson Dilworth would have provided such leadership magnificently. Yet, with the American people at last coming out of the Eisenhower trance, what do the bosses offer as Democratic alternatives? What leadership can we expect from Tom Dodd, with his purple rhetoric about "liberation" and his ambiguous relations with the Teamsters? What from Frank Hogan, a respectable district attorney who has hardly voiced a public thought on a national issue in half a century and is now gravely presented by Carmine De Sapio to the voters of New York as a man worthy to sit in the seat of Wagner and Lehman?

A party which seeks to qualify itself for responsibility in an age of national and international crisis is not well advised to begin to do so by blowing out its own brains.

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OUR CHINA POLICY

Waiting for Disaster

by LOUIS J. HALLE

STATESMANSHIP consists in outliving rather than being outlived by one's mistakes. Because it has to march in the dark, guessing at the turns in the road, it cannot altogether avoid mistakes. Once a mistake has been made, however, the cardinal sin is to commit oneself to it until death.

When China's Nationalist regime collapsed in 1949 and was replaced by the Communists the event called for the formation of a new American policy. In terms of traditional and accepted behavior this posed no extraordinary intellectual problem. When a revolution ends with the replacement of an old regime by a new the practice is to recognize the new regime and enter into relations with it, whether one approves of it or not, as soon as it has established itself and apparently been accepted in its own country. Mr. Dulles, in *War or Peace,* recommended that we adopt this policy in the case of the new Chinese regime. This was what the Democratic Administration in Washington was getting ready to do. Before long the pursuing Communists would have routed the fleeing Nationalists from their last footholds on the offshore islands and Formosa. These islands were not then regarded by our military as strategically vital to our security. In any case they were Chinese, not American, and this was a Chinese civil war.

What was it that prevented us from going ahead on these lines?

American public opinion was shocked by the fall of our wartime comrade-in-arms, Chiang Kai-shek. Since it assumed that he had had the support of the Chinese people the event could be explained only as disguised aggression from without, involving a conspiracy by what Senator McCarthy—and, to the shame of a great political party, not only Senator McCarthy—told the American people were the Communists who held office in Washington. In these circumstances to adopt the correct policy, the only policy with constructive possibilities, would not have been easy. But there were courageous men in Washington who were bent on doing whatever was the right thing whether it was the popular thing or not. At the moment of the disaster to the Nationalists, Secretary of State Acheson, who had taken office while it was in process, said we should "let the dust settle" and then fix our course. This was an eminently sensible thing to say. But the mood of the country was not sensible and the opposition, taking advantage of it, threw up their hands, telling the public that it was a shocking thing to say. So began one of those periods of psychological disturbance that occasionally afflict the best of democracies.

ON TOP OF IT came the outbreak of the Korean War. We were unprepared and decisions had to be made almost overnight. One of these was the decision to intervene in the final mopping-up stage of the Chinese civil war by interposing our guns between Chiang's Formosan refuge and the mainland. It was made in response to military alarm at the defenseless state in which Japan would be left by the transfer of our occupation troops to Korea. Military prudence tends to equate capabilities with intentions in a possible foe, and the fact that the Chinese Communists, though their hands were full at home, could theoretically invade Japan made it seem advisable to hold Formosa as a counter-threat on the Chinese flank. This represented a triumph of military over political thinking, which was not strange in the circumstances. But the decision was addressed only to the immediate military emergency. It was not regarded as a commitment to defend Formosa when the emergency was over. With the passage of time, however, not only a large part of our public but many of our military men began to regard the island as if it were American rather than Chinese soil (it is treason to give away American soil), and in all the altered circumstances the assertion that it had now become vital to our defense represented the path of least intellectual and political resistance.

I do not underestimate the fanatical hostility and outrageous behavior that the Chinese Communists had already manifested toward us as their ideological opponents and the friends of their Nationalist foe. But our military intervention in the civil war, at the moment of their final victory, could be viewed by them only as a major challenge, even though we had been careful to maintain a nominal neutrality by interdicting attack from either

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side. (When the new Administration took office the President's speech-writers abandoned this nominal neutrality in a move to discredit its predecessors with the voters.) The subsequent charge of our victorious armies up the Korean peninsula toward the Chinese border confronted them with the kind of situation to which any military staff would almost surely make an alarmed and desperate response. That our troops might cross the border would not have been less plausible in Chinese eyes than that theirs might invade Japan had been in ours. When, consequently, we found ourselves locked in military combat with the new Chinese regime it was too late to normalize relations with it.

Our policy now associated us in active partisanship with the exiled Nationalist regime's policy of fighting its way back to Peking and re-establishing the *status quo ante*. The objective of this policy, as of any policy that requires the abolition of the enemy, was unconditional surrender. Washington had not planned it that way, but irresistible circumstances had forced it.

The objective of restoring the Nationalist regime seemed the less difficult to a deluded public because of the premises on which it based its thinking: (1) that the freedom-loving Chinese people had been conquered, and their own government had been ousted by a foreign conspiracy using brute force; (2) that the force was wielded by puppets who were, in turn, manipulated by Moscow; (3) that the new Communist regime had been imposed from without and was committed to making China a Russian satellite like Rumania; (4) that the Chinese people would rise up against it at the first opportunity; and (5) that they would then welcome back with open arms their own exiled Nationalist regime.

Knowledgeable persons knew better, but the truths they would have told now bore the label of "treason" in the public mind. No debate is possible where the subject is "Treason *vs.* Patriotism."

Since we were increasingly stuck with the new policy, it became necessary to rationalize it. The ingenuity of civil servants was tested and not always found wanting. The final *ex post facto* rationalization took the form of the theory that inexorable pressure on the Peking regime was the best means of straining relations between it and Moscow, that it offered the best chance of splitting the two apart. If we bore down on Peking with an economic boycott, Peking would turn to Moscow for more economic relief than Moscow would be willing to give. If, through Chiang Kai-shek and directly, we threatened Peking with a military thrashing, Peking would turn to Moscow for more military hardware than Moscow would feel able to spare. Q.E.D. The relations between the two allies would approach the breaking point.

This was bad theory, and any graduate student who advanced it in a paper might well have been told to go back and study his history. Thucydides knew what J. P. T. Bury later formulated as an historical law: that pressure from without produces cohesion within. Nothing contributed more to the consolidation of Communist power in Russia from 1917 to 1919 than the pressure of the foreign expeditionary forces that were launched against it. While the Nazi pressure in 1941 and 1942 did produce a strain on the opposing coalition in the form of the controversy over a "second front," its primary and overriding effect was to make the two parties to the controversy feel that, whatever their incompatibility, their survival depended on sticking together. It was only when the Nazi pressure was relieved that Russia and the Western powers fell apart.

In any case, our pressure could not really have been expected to turn Peking away from Moscow while its overt objective was Peking's extinction. The alternative we offered to Peking's partnership with Moscow would have had to be made more attractive than that.

THE YEARS have passed and times have changed. Today the Korean War is a tale we tell our children. "McCarthy" is the adjective that identifies an era in American history. But the old policy, with its premises and its theory, remains. It remains, not because many of us believe in either the premises or the theory any more, but simply by force of inertia. While we remain alive from day to day in spite of its continuance, and while we remember the troubles of a few years ago, no one in a position to do so is tempted to take the lead that would have to be taken in order to replace it. To wait for approaching disaster, hoping it will not come, is the easiest thing for men who are tired and fully occupied with "catching fast ones."

What should our policy be?

Debilitating strains are bound to exist, obviously do exist, between Moscow and Peking. We ought to exploit them. Pressure may be one way of exploiting them. But there are other ways that not only are better in themselves but better in being less dangerous.

For a number of years past the balance of relationships within our government has given military thinking a bigger voice than it usually has in civilian governments. At the same time, the diplomatic profession has not been in political favor. The consequence has been Washington's tendency to prefer military to diplomatic means in the combinations between them or where a choice can be made. Some of us would say that China is one point where a choice can be made and better had be made in favor of diplomacy. No one knows how much time we have left, and as this article is written I cannot be sure we have until publication-day. The hope in which it is written, however, is that we will have at least the time between the present crisis and the next one.

Foreign policy, because it must advance into the unknown, can never take the form of a detailed itinerary with timetable. Often it is simply a matter of being in a good position for whatever shows up around the next

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bend. Today we are frozen in a no-negotiating position. We cannot negotiate Peking's suicide. And as long as this remains our overt objective we cannot negotiate a settlement in Formosa and the offshore islands. Even under circumstances in which our relative power to make it good was increasing, this might not be the best position for us to be in. Where that power is decreasing it is an excessively bad position to be in.

More than anything else, the frozen position in international politics is what leads to war; and the point at which war breaks out is the point of no negotiation.

A war with China might not become World War III, although we should hesitate to test the proposition. But if we should get into a war with China anyway one would wish it to be over a vital issue on which we were so plainly right that all the world could see we were. The defense of American soil against the Japanese onslaught of December 7, 1941, was such an issue. The defense of distant Chinese soil against the Chinese is not. On this issue we would have the grim opposition of the whole free world including our closest allies, except as they were grudgingly constrained to pay lip-service. And from the day of the first casualty-lists we might expect the American people to ask with increasing importunity why American boys were dying to keep Chinese possessions out of Chinese hands. It would do no good for Washington to say that, in the defense of international law, we were meeting China's expansionist aggression against its own offshore islands. Everyone knows that if Communists, supported by Moscow, held Long Island, Mr. Dulles would not consider it aggression to step across the Sound and take it from them. "Where I could not be honest," says Shakespeare's Albany, "I never yet was valiant."

The alternative to our present position is that of being willing to recognize the Peking regime under proper circumstances, being willing then to accept its entrance into the United Nations, and being willing to negotiate about Formosa. This would not bring about the regime's fall and the reinstatement of Chiang Kai-shek. These are not plausible objectives of policy. But it would bring Peking out into the open arena of international politics, where any reluctance to act on Moscow's pleading would be more conspicuous and more damaging to the Communist cause. One can contemplate with equanimity the difficulty that the Russian delegate in New York might have in establishing an effective screening procedure for the speeches of his Chinese colleague; or the alternative anxiety with which he might await those speeches. And one does not have to be any more Machiavellian than Mr. Dulles to think of the opportunities we would have to introduce into the UN councils issues on which Moscow and Peking were unlikely to agree.

The alternative to our present position would have to the full that support which our allies give today, where they feel obliged to give it at all, against their judgment. For the record shows that our present China policy has been effective only in splitting our own alliance. And it would, finally, make sense to the general opinion of mankind, as our present position does not.

The alternative position would open the channels of negotiation, with the range of possibilities that might then be explored. Not to be excluded from them is the possibility that an acceptable alternative to complete dependence on Moscow might, one of these days, be welcome to those in Peking who have to deal with Moscow. Not even to be excluded forever, so changeable is the world we live in, is the possibility of speculation by the people in Moscow, under some circumstances, on whether we might be brought to cooperate in keeping China within bounds. Developments like this have in the past, at least, been listed among the accomplishments of diplomacy. Let those who don't believe in such possibilities, who believe in naked threats alone, ask themselves how it is that the British are still in Hong Kong.

THERE probably are those in Washington who devoutly wish we were in the alternative position. To them the problem is not what position it would be nice to be in but how ever to get out of the old one. This is, indeed, the problem. It would take courage and a sure hand. There would have to be diplomatic conversations in many quarters by men who could be sure of the backing and protection of their chiefs in Washington—conversations that should not be published in daily communiqués. Heavy diplomatic pressures could be brought on Peking, especially by some of the Asian leaders who would be only too glad to bring them again, as they did at Bandung, in what they considered a hopeful cause. Peking might then see the value of concessions counter to our own.

Getting out of our present position would also take an act of political leadership at home. It may be doubted that the American public ever felt the degree of allegiance to the Nationalist regime that some thought it did, and it may be doubted whether many Americans today stand ready to give their blood for it. An analysis of voting strength, moreover, would surely not justify the view that the opposition of a Senator Knowland is formidable. With the Korean War and the McCarthy Era over, it may be that a generous providence has given us time and opportunity to move from our eventually untenable position to one that is relatively sound.

The act of leadership would not appear impossible to a strong government. One would wish our present government to undertake it. As a second resort, however, one must look to the patriotic opposition to ask where our present policy is actually leading us, and whether we are willing to go there. Faced with such questions, the American people might prove extraordinarily sober. But the questions have got to be asked, out loud, and rather soon.

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Negotiating with the Russians—II

A Strategy for Non-Communists

by MICHAEL LINDSAY

PREVIOUSLY in these pages, I endeavored to establish three main points:

► ANY kind of serious discussions between Communists and non-Communists would be extremely important. They could provide much clearer evidence than is at present available about how far Communism, in its present form and under its present leaders, is a system with which peaceful co-existence is possible or a system with which only a balance of power is possible. Such evidence is necessary for a reasoned decision about the basic principles of non-Communist policy. Also, if peaceful coexistence is possible, discussion of this kind is essential to enable both sides to plan their policy in such a way as to attain it.

► IT is unlikely that the Communists, under their present leadership, would spontaneously join in such discussions. Up to now they have shown a strong reluctance to engage in serious discussion and have used contacts with non-Communists primarily to obtain an advantage in propaganda appeals to public opinion, often with some degree of success.

► COMMUNIST successes in appealing to public opinion have depended on the inept handling of the non-Communist case and the successes could not be prevented by a non-Communist policy of restricting contacts. Such restriction would, in itself, put the Communists in a very favorable position for propaganda.

In this situation what is the best strategy for the non-Communist powers?

It is not possible to compel the Communists to join in serious discussions if they are determined not to do so. On the other hand, it should be possible, in fact not very difficult, to create a situation in which the Communists would either have to join in serious discussions or else be largely discredited in the propaganda struggle. If the Communists respond by becoming willing to join in serious discussion then it will become possible to obtain clearer evidence about the Communist position. If this shows that peaceful coexistence is possible then further discussion and negotiation will lead to a lessening of world tension. If, however, the extra evidence strengthens the case for believing that Communism is at present inherently aggressive then it will become easier to obtain general support for the necessary policy of building up a balance of power; the neutralist arguments against such a policy will be greatly weakened. If the Communists still refuse to join in serious discussions and the refusal is used to discredit their claims to want peace, this will also weaken the neutralist position and weaken the ability of Communist propaganda to support subversion. In the long run, a situation in which the Communist claims to want peace had been discredited would favor the replacement of an aggressive Communist leadership by a new leadership which was prepared to cooperate for peace.

One obvious move in such a non-Communist strategy is to formulate the questions which can give the clearest tests of Communist readiness to cooperate for peace; to ask them; and to give the fullest possible publicity to a refusal to answer them.

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For example, the obvious reply to Soviet proposals for non-aggression pacts, such as the proposed pact between the Warsaw Pact group and the NATO group, would be to ask in what way these proposed pacts differed from the non-aggression treaties which the Soviet Government had signed in the past with Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland. This could be an entirely serious question and not simply an attempt to score a point in propaganda. If the Soviet Government were willing to admit that the Soviet Union under Stalin's leadership had broken its treaty obligations in these cases it would repudiate an official line which Soviet statements and publications have consistently followed up to the present. If such an admission were made public in the Communist ruled world as well as in the non-Communist world it would suggest that the Soviet Government was seriously concerned to try to restore its reputation as a power likely to observe its agreements. There would then be reason to attach a fairly high value to Soviet promises in new agreements. If, on the other hand, the Soviet Government refused to answer the question and continued to claim that it had always strictly and scrupulously observed its treaty obligations it would be clear that only bargains for simultaneous performance could usefully be made with the Soviet Government. And the evidence for this could be publicized.

Secretary Dulles and other non-Communist leaders have made speeches saying that the Communist record in breaking agreements makes it impossible to put much trust in the promises of Communist regimes, but these charges have usually been made in general terms and have not been made specifically in official replies to Soviet

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proposals. This type of statement is not very effective in appealing to public opinion. General denunciations of Communist bad faith may be stimulating to those who already agree with them but they are not convincing to those who do not agree. It is easy for neutralist opinion to feel that the denunciations from both sides cancel out.

Mr. Macmillan's remark that the proposed non-aggression pact between the NATO group and the Warsaw Pact group might do some good and would not do any harm suggested a failure to think out the basic issues involved. (And later statements suggest that he has realized this.) To make a pact whose actual value was probably completely different from its face value would simply add to uncertainty and confusion. If the pact were treated seriously and allowed to influence NATO policy it would be taking a gamble with non-Communist security; it would be a partial acceptance of the neutralist position without any evidence to show that this was justified. If, on the other hand, the pact was not allowed to make any difference to NATO defense preparations this would provide the Communists with an additional reason for suspecting the good faith of the non-Communist powers and would enable them to argue that those powers did not treat agreements seriously.

Even some of the more theoretical questions about the Communist position might be raised at the official level. Non-Communist statements on a possible summit conference have made the distinction between agreement on basic issues, which is regarded as not very hopeful, and agreement on minor points, which might be possible. They do not, however, show a realization of how far an attempt to discuss basic disagreements would have to bring in ideological issues. For example, it is argued that a top level meeting ought to discuss German re-unification and Eastern Europe. But to discuss these, except as subjects for possible bargains, would involve basic questions. Soviet arguments on the subject always start from the claim that the governments of East Germany and the "satellite states" are regimes representing the people they control. The non-Communist case depends on the claim that these regimes do not really represent the peoples they control but were imposed and are maintained by Soviet military intervention or the threat of it. In this situation discussion of German unification or the "satellite states" would be completely at cross purposes unless it went back to the underlying basic questions: what standards and what sort of evidence can show whether or not a regime is justified in claiming to represent the people over whom it rules?

It is probably true that the chances of reaching agreement on such fundamental questions at a Summit conference are small. But it is also true that a Communist refusal to reach at least a partial agreement could be used very greatly to discredit Communist claims to want peace and to want the settlement of disputes by discussion and negotiation. The case for holding that no agreement is possible between non-Communists and the present Communist leaders would become much more convincing even to neutralist opinion if the Communist leaders stated explicitly that the claim of Communist regimes to represent the people would not be disproved by any empirical evidence or if they themselves asserted that no agreement was possible between Communists and non-Communists because Communist truth was different from non-Communist truth. It would also discredit Communist claims of readiness to work for peace through discussion and negotiation if the Communist leaders simply refused to discuss the basic disagreements which could be shown to underlie the particular disputes which are a threat to peace. Thus, if the non-Communist representatives at any discussion thought out the basic issues involved and worked out the questions which provided the best tests of the Communist position, they would have a good chance of producing a situation in which either some genuine agreement was reached or else the failure to reach agreement could be used to discredit Communist claims.

The seriousness of a failure to reach agreement on basic issues is often obscured because people do not distinguish between bargaining agreements and agreements

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IN AN EARLIER ARTICLE (*NR*, August 18) Lord Lindsay of Birker discussed certain dilemmas in any search for accommodation with the Communist powers—their "bad record" in observing agreements, their "absolute priority to the objective of socialism . . . defined in terms of Communist power." Although Communists deliberately exploit contacts with non-Communists for propaganda purposes, he concluded, the West need not and should not despair of finding a *modus vivendi*. When the Communists have been the gainers in past negotiations this "has been the result of non-Communist ineptitude rather than of any special cogency in the Communist case or exceptional ability in debate."

IN SUGGESTING here a strategy for non-Communists Lord Lindsay speaks with unusual credentials. He has known intimately the Communist leadership in China (he and his Chinese wife lived and worked with Mao's Red Army during Sino-Japanese hostilities) and has made some remarkable recent personal and scholarly tests of Communist willingness to enter into serious discussion of East-West differences. These tests are described in a forthcoming book *Is Peaceful Co-Existence Possible?*

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to cooperate. A bargain is simply an agreement that one party will do certain things in return for the other party doing certain other things. The parties need not agree on anything else and the making of a bargain does not necessarily produce any lessening of hostility and suspicion. It is rather confusing to say that there is hope of making some progress through limited agreements even though it is very unlikely that negotiations with the Communist powers will produce any agreement on basic issues. It is confusing because a series of bargains do not not necessarily add up to progress towards a lessening of hostility or agreement to cooperate. Bargains on disputed issues show that both sides, for the time being, prefer to compromise rather than fight and they can do this while remaining mutually convinced that the other side is inherently aggressive and prefers not to fight only because of the balance of power. Bargaining may help to preserve a balance of power equilibrium by securing compromise on disputes which might otherwise lead to war, but it does nothing directly towards replacing a balance of power by peaceful coexistence. It can only help in this by giving time for other influences to operate which could lessen the basic disagreements between the systems and by producing a less immediately critical atmosphere more favorable to their operation.

The same arguments apply even more strongly to trading agreements. Trading will increase contacts between the two systems which could provide an opportunity for better understanding, but it will not produce better understanding unless the opportunity is used. And it is possible for trading to be used as a means for gaining advantage in a power struggle in ways which increase rather than diminish international tension. For example, though trade between Japan and the Chinese mainland could be to the economic advantage of both countries it seems clear that the Peking authorities have been mainly interested in using it as a means of applying political pressure. Or again, Communist regimes have used trading as a means to finance Communist activity in non-Communist countries.

A strategy aimed at securing a peace which is more than a balance of power equilibrium must, therefore, make clear that bargaining agreements can only provide the opportunity for reaching agreement on more fundamental issues and that progress towards peaceful coexistence is only possible if these opportunities are used.

The most important type of possible bargaining agreement is probably disarmament because an effective agreement on disarmament could do so much to produce the sort of atmosphere in which it would become easier to settle more fundamental issues. The crucial difficulty in reaching agreement is the problem of securing guarantees for future performance, and the Communist powers have a natural advantage in using disarmament as an issue for publicity because of the secrecy with which their governments operate. On many points a simple agreement without any inspection system to check observance would give the Communist powers a considerable degree of security for future performance because it is unlikely that the democratic countries could break their treaty obligations on any appreciable scale without the fact becoming public. (This would apply with special force to the United States where government operates with a specially high degree of publicity.) It would, for example, be very difficult for a democratic country to maintain numbers of men in its armed forces above any limits prescribed by treaty without the facts becoming generally known. A totalitarian regime, on the other hand, could break its obligations on a considerable scale without the fact becaming public.

Though the non-Communist powers have always insisted that a disarmament agreement would be no good unless it included effective provisions for inspection, it is only in a few fields that they have tried to give operational definitions of what they would mean by effective inspection. There are the various proposals for inspection from the air to guard against surprise attack, and an effective inspection system for atomic weapons tests now is agreed to be feasible. In other fields one gets the impression that people have no clear idea of how an effective inspection system could be devised and that this accounts for the curious unreality of so much of the negotiation on disarmament. The Communist powers seem to prefer agreements with the minimum of provisions for inspection. The non-Communist powers stress the need for inspection but seem hesitant to commit themselves fully to definite proposals, which is understandable if they have not been able to think of an inspection system which would really give them adequate security. In this situation the Communist powers can point to their readiness to accept simple and definite disarmament agreements and can interpret the hesitancy of the non-Communist powers as evidence of insincerity in wanting disarmament. To secure an effective agreement on disarmament or to remove this Communist advantage in publicity the non-Communist powers need to devise an inspection scheme which could be effective.

It is hard to see how the conventional type of inspection system could be effective against a totalitarian government which was trying to evade its obligations. The clearest case to show the ineffectiveness of a normal inspection system was the attempt to enforce the disarmament provisions of the Treaty of Versailles. The Inter-allied Control Commission was operating in a defeated country with considerable powers given it by the peace

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treaty. It was staffed by competent professionals and co-operation between the different national groups was good. The Weimar Republic was not a totalitarian state and only some groups in the country wanted to frustrate the activities of the Commission. In spite of all this it was not possible to prevent a considerable amount of evasion. If the conventional type of inspection system had only limited success under these very favorable conditions it is extremely unlikely that any system of this kind could give reasonable security that a modern Communist regime was not evading its obligations.

To have even a reasonable chance of detecting evasions the inspection commission would need an extremely large staff with very wide powers and would have to exercise these powers in a way that would cause a good deal of unpleasantness even when no evasions were discovered. It would be very difficult to recruit a really large and competent staff from the genuinely neutral countries and very difficult to ensure that this staff continued to act with a sufficient degree of suspicion and readiness to be unpleasant to make their inspection effective.

There was, however, one aspect of the attempted control of German disarmament after 1919 which suggests the possibility of an unconventional type of scheme which might be effective. The successes of the Inter-allied Control Commission in detecting evasion of the treaty provisions depended to a considerable extent on the assistance received from German citizens of pacifist or left-wing political views—workers would report stores of arms they had helped to hide, opponents of the Reichswehr would report its plans for evasion and so on. One reason for the ineffectiveness of control was that this type of assistance dried up when the German courts started to impose convictions for treason on those German citizens who had assisted the Commission.

A power which could make an inspection commission really effective would be the power to offer rewards and protection to people giving information leading to the discovery of evasions of a disarmament treaty. This would create a situation in which a government which wanted to evade its obligations would have to see that everyone connected with the treaty breaking project was of such a high security rating that they could be trusted not to reveal the project even when they could do so with impunity and perhaps with actual personal advantage to themselves. And the need for this security rating would not be confined to those directly concerned in the project. It would also be required for all those in a position to know that something was going on which might be an evasion of the treaty. This limitation would make it very hard to avoid detection of any project which involved considerable amounts of manpower or equipment which could be seen by the local population.

The inspection commission would still need fairly wide powers but it would not need a very large staff. Most important, it could operate in a very different way when most of its investigations started on the basis of information supplied by people who had inside knowledge of a treaty breaking project or who at least had knowledge from which they could reasonably suspect the existence of such a project.

It is fairly certain that any substantial or prolonged breach of treaty obligations would be reported to the inspection commission. In all countries there are a great many people who do not agree with the slogan, "My country right or wrong," and who would consider that they had a stronger loyalty to the cause of peace than to a government which was evading its treaty obligations. In Communist ruled countries it is probable that a considerable proportion of the population would be only too glad of an opportunity both to discredit their government and also to become a refugee in a non-Communist country with enough money to start a new career. And this group might well include a number of people sufficiently high in government service to have a lot of information.

So far as I know this type of inspection scheme has not been suggested previously, but it does seem to be a possible solution of the problem of getting a fairly high degree of certainty in checking the observance of a disarmament agreement by a totalitarian government.

The Communist regimes have always shown their dislike of inspection schemes and they would almost certainly reject an inspection scheme that was likely to be really effective. But the proposal of a general disarmament agreement backed by such an effective inspection scheme would still be an important move in a strategy aimed at producing a situation in which the Communist powers either had genuinely to co-operate for peace or else be discredited in their claims to want peace. Non-Communist publicity would be able to say convincingly: "We have proposed a disarmament plan backed by an inspection scheme which could make practically certain that neither we nor the Communist regimes could secretly break the agreement. The Communist regimes refuse to accept any agreement except under conditions which would leave them free to break it secretly if they wished to do so." If the Communist powers reacted by becoming willing to co-operate in a genuine attempt to work out a mutually satisfactory scheme they could be invited to suggest alternative inspection systems which could give the same sort of degree of security. In either alternative the resulting situation would be preferable to the present one in which disarmament negotiations are deadlocked on most issues and in which the hesitancy of the non-Communist powers in producing definite plans which they would be prepared to stand by works to the advantage of Communist propaganda.

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The Superficial Aspect

Truman Was Right

EISENHOWER'S remarkable ability to twitch the rug from under his presumed friends while gazing innocently into the far distance was never better demonstrated than by his press conference remark about racial segregation in the schools. It was merely an opinion. It has no force of law. It commits the President to nothing. You can't pin a thing on Ike, but nevertheless he has joined Faubus against the Supreme Court and the Negroes.

The explanation is that he has discovered that desegregation is by no means as popular in the country at large as its enthusiastic proponents had led him to believe, and you can count on Ike to run out when the going gets rough and he finds himself on the unpopular side. He has stabbed the integration program in the back. Whether he has killed it remains to be seen, but he has certainly crippled it. His blow was perfectly timed. In connection with the race riots in England it will probably set definitely against segregation millions in the North and West who never cared much about it, one way or the other.

Liberals, however, will be ill-advised if they react to this incident with only disgust. They should give careful study to its significance, not as regards Eisenhower, but as it throws light on their own procedure. With competent leadership, progress can be made rapidly; but with no leadership, caution is imperative. This applies far beyond the issue of racial segregation, beyond even the larger issue of second-class citizenship. It applies to the whole field of government.

For instance, in the vastly greater problem of the establishment of world order under the reign of law, the question of the immediate next step cannot be answered without careful consideration of who is to take the step. A move that might be perfectly logical and desirable if made by a Woodrow Wilson could be disastrous if attempted by an Eisenhower.

A conference at the summit, for example, is obviously desirable in theory; but it is not advisable to demand talks when you have nobody who can talk effectively for your side. To send Eisenhower up against that fast-talking Russian outfit would be suicidal, as *The Manchester Guardian* was impolite enough to point out a month go.

Then there is the question of China. Our present insistence that the island of Formosa is China and that Chiang Kai-shek is one of the Five Great Powers is little short of imbecility. But it does not follow that to demand its instant abandonment is wise. If we abandon our present policy we must replace it with another; and is it possible that Eisenhower and Dulles can devise anything better?

The promising field of activity for liberalism at this moment is not Washington; it is out in the country. In the matter of segregation, for instance, the job of the integrationists is to convince Arkansas, not Eisenhower. If it is objected that convincing Arkansas is impossible, the answer is that convincing Eisenhower is futile, for he cannot be relied on to stay convinced ten minutes.

This is equally true as regards the preservation of American freedom. The current assault on the Supreme Court is based on its adherence to the Bill of Rights. The tin-pot Mussolinis now raging against the Court would not dare open their mouths had not the common people been partially anesthetized by the opiate of sentimental hero-worship, which astute politicians managed to substitute for reasonable trust in proved leadership.

The encouraging factor in the situation is that the anesthetic has not been entirely effective, not as effective as it was in 1924, when the nonentity Coolidge won when the poison was religious and racial hatred, and not nearly as effective as it was in 1872, when hero-worship returned the fabulously incompetent Grant to the office he had proved incapable of filling. Even the people bemused into accepting Eisenhower could not be persuaded to accept his party.

NEVERTHELESS, the hope of establishing a realistic governmental policy based on fact, not on romantic fantasy, and designed to promote the general welfare, not the interest of an oligarchy, rests with the electorate, and must continue there for the next two years. Truman was right. Eisenhower was a good general as long as he had somebody to tell him what to do; he can lead the country when he is driven to lead it by the pressure of strong public opinion.

But he lacks a self-starter. Left to himself he will accept his driving impulse from gentry who allow their expenses to be paid by oil and real-estate interests, and accept vicuña coats from contractors with questionable records. He has publicly admitted that he needs such. No doubt he would feel lost without them. So his collapse under the pressure of Faubus and his like need not necessarily be a total loss. If it impels liberals to a more realistic view of their own position it may in the long run assist, rather than hinder, the return of decency to government, or government to decency.

GERALD W. JOHNSON

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BOOKS & COMMENT

The Three Faces of Milovan Djilas

by Paul Willen

MILOVAN DJILAS has already made two outstanding careers in his life: the first, as one of the prime architects of the breathtaking military and political conquests of Yugoslav Communism; the second, as the most eloquent spokesman for the anti-Communist upheaval in eastern Europe which culminated in the Hungarian revolution. To this extraordinary record Djilas has now added a third reputation, the laurels of a first class writer, demonstrated in his new book, *Land Without Justice*.

This book has not made the same widespread impression as his fiercely anti-capitalist *New Yugoslavia* (written with Edvard Kardelj in 1948) or his violently anti-Communist *New Class* (published here last year), and yet, if it is republished in his own land, it will probably outlive both of his earlier works. For in this book a very talented, but often misled young man has at last found — or rediscovered perhaps — his true calling. He has written what is probably the most moving book to come out of the Communist east since the publication of Sholokov's *The Silent Don* almost 30 years ago.

Land Without Justice, by Milovan Djilas (Harcourt, Brace; $5.95).

Indeed, it is only with the publication of this beautiful collection of early reminiscences that we get our first real glimpse of the human being behind the mask of conflicting abstractions characteristic of his earlier works—and as a result some explanation for the strikingly diverse passions of this "multiple personality." It may be premature to proclaim that "this is really *him*"; and yet the ground has never been steadier under his feet than it is in this book.

Land Without Justice, by the "true Djilas," is a book utterly barren of political overtones and ideological concern. It describes a world completely remote from the one Djilas has been thinking about for so long — a world peopled with sensuous women and bold outlaws, despotic rulers and discrete love affairs, in a setting of jagged mountains, cool rivers, and secluded valleys; a world which, in spite of a superficial resemblance to the Montenegro of his youth, is essentially his own, where his memory and imagination can mix and play with a freedom that suits his style far better than the world of contemporary politics.

THAT this old-fashioned land of dauntless heroes, enchanting women, unrequited loves was created at the very time that Djilas was writing *The New Class* continually astonishes the reader. It represents not only literary diversity, but a real clash of mental images.

Great passions; high adventure. The book is dedicated to his grandfather, Aleksa Djilas, who was cruelly murdered by his fellow-Montenegrins because he had, in turn, avenged the murder of his uncle by wiping out *his* murderer. This uncle had, in his turn, been killed because he had, contrary to the orders of the Montenegrin Prince, assasinated the two Turkish ambassadors whom he was supposed to escort out of the country for the Prince. And all of this set in a landscape of bare mountain cliffs, dark cold nights, sudden ambushes, with the clash of knives and the distant howling of wolves. And what a Prince! Little wonder that Djilas' granduncle found it difficult to subdue his hatred of the Turks when ordered to do so by a Prince "through whose windows one could always see Turkish heads drying on stakes."

Djilas is proud of his heroic Montenegrin ancestors; and bitter about their alleged betrayal by the Serbs during the first World War. But this kind of conventional local patriotism—so common to a rough mountain people—is only a minor theme in the book. On the contrary, he curses this heritage as often as he glories in it. During the Austrian occupation of World War I a number of local women permitted intimacies with the invaders, for which they were scorned, and sometimes killed, by their neighbors. One was a "pretty woman, with cat-like green eyes and black hair, a young widow, all soft, cuddly, and white," who frequented the Djilas home, and was affectionate with the children, including the four-year-old Djilas. When the Austrians retreated, she was punished, and left town. "In the memory," Djilas recalls, "there remains only the warmth of her embrace and the hardness of popular justice."

When the Montenegrins seized and looted Moslem homes and fields Djilas could not help but see the horror of it: " . . . a kind of perverse vow, some deep inner pleasure at attacking an alien faith with which a struggle to the death had constituted a historic way of life and thought." As a boy Djilas was fascinated by the life of the Turkish towns, whose slow, sensuous graceful ways were in such sharp contrast to the austerity and bluntness of his own heritage. "Beautiful plump maidens and young widows caused serenades to be sung to the lute, knives to stab breasts, and whole regions to go mad." And further: "Secret loves were an aim in life, and easy-going flirtations were a form of entertainment." Again and again he returns to the "refined passions," the "sickly intoxication," which he imagined behind the "grilled windows and courtyard gates" of the nearby Turkish homes.

EVEN the neighboring Serbs caught his envious eye and his yearning heart. The half-Serb town of Berane was described as "more prosperous and diverse, riper and deeper" than his own crude Montenegrin village:

> The cobblestones of their courtyards shone, their floors were golden yellow, and their copperware gleamed. Everything they owned was polished, soft, or warm. With them life ran its course imperceptibly, while the Montenegrins . . . lived a life of constant turmoil.

The contrast between the crudeness of his life and the softness and richness of the valley people is a strong motif in the book. The mountain people were continuously fighting the valley peoples —the Turks, the Serbs. "In that struggle the plains were always held by someone alien to the mountaineers, who were hun-

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gry for bread and grain, and tired of the bare, though beautiful, crags that were their home." The mountaineers could either become assimilated to the "polished, soft, and warm" life below, or could loot the homes of the valley people and return to the "bare, though beautiful, crags" above. The young Djilas was attracted to both alternatives; he associated the softness and order of the valleys with his well-organized half-Montenegrin mother, and the austerity and bravado of the mountaineers with his brave but garrulous father.

DJILAS' CAPACITY to describe the salient eccentricities of the outstanding people in his richly eccentric community is quite phenomenal. There was, for example, a rich merchant who, in order to compensate for the fact that he was completely hairless, sought glory in war. "He would always press forward to assert his manhood. But he had no luck; no bullet would have him." And then another: a high school superintendent, a wild creature who loved archaeology, music, and politics, "quite a ladies' man" who chased his own students through the fields at night when he suspected they had caught him on one of his nightly prowls. "Still he accomplished much for the region," Djilas writes, enabling it "to give rise to several hundred intellectuals at a time when educated men were rarer than church bells in a Moslem land." The women stand out forcibly, especially a local beauty who had captured the heart of an unfortunate Russian emigré.

> Her skin glistened with a mysterious luster from within. Her chestnut hair, which she wore long, rose in heavy and rich waves of old gold. As though aware of the radiance and power of her body, she liked to exhibit her bare shoulders and arms, which had dimples and curves that undulated one unto another. . . . The whole town shone with her beauty, and that beauty shone with her awareness of it.

The passion of the emigré was all the greater because it was unrequited; the anti-Serb guerrilla fighters were all the more admirable because their struggle could conclude only in death; and the refinement of the Turkish towns was all the more impressive because their tenure in Yugoslavia was about to end. Rulers are generally corrupt; outlaws tend to become sadistic; beautiful women ally themselves with weak men; marriage destroys the beauty of a great love. In spite of this ruthless picture, *Land Without Justice* contains hardly a single genuine note of bitterness; rather it is written with sadness and great compassion. The sadness comes not from the crudeness of life, but because of its inherent unfulfillment, the inevitable gap between aspiration and reality, the inexorable loss which occurs with the swift passage of time. The pleasures are few—"happy dreams"—such as his chance encounter at dusk with a girl whose smiling "dark green eyes" flickered a momentary hope to the young Djilas—and one can ask for no more.

The gap separating the romantic reminisences of Djilas' youth and the strident, harsh writing of his later years is clearly a large one. In one of his few self-analytical passages, Djilas attempts to bridge this gap for the reader:

> Finding myself even then . . . with the dilemma of choosing between my personal desire and those moral obligations that I felt I owed society, I always decided in favor of the latter.

Specifically, this meant "rejecting love," and even more, rejecting hatred. One of his early Communist mentors, an older man in his community, had attempted to seduce a pretty young girl, and "his pupil at that!" Djilas writes, in recalling his horror at the discovery of this moral discrepancy in the life of a "bearer of such a great idea as Communism." Djilas struggled with himself to contain his anger. "Feeling that I hated this man, I suppressed the hate. I succeeded even in liking him, though without warmth, even more than was required by our tie, either personal or ideological."

THIS hatred, and this warmth, remained suppressed for nearly 25 years, as Djilas merged his life with that of Yugoslavia's vibrant Communist movement. This emotional discipline no doubt accompanies the conversion to Communism of most of its voluntary adherents; and yet in the case of Djilas this act involved a particularly sharp restriction of his potential emotional life. The retention of this discipline was possible, and seemed justified, only in the period when Yugoslav Communism attained its uniquely great emotional reaches. But even in that period the early motifs of Djilas' personal life were not altogether subdued.

WITH the triumph of Communism in Montenegro many of his childhood friends, who had fought on the opposite side, were imprisoned or shot, with his approval. Djilas does not apologize for his role; and this is fortunate, for it would be inconsistent with his true character, which neither condemns nor condones, but rather only registers a philosophic unhappiness at the inevitable human loss which accompanies every turn in human affairs. And then later one of his earliest loves, who sided with Moscow in the 1948 dispute, was thrown in jail, again with his support. Yet his essentially human evaluation of this woman is unchanged: "Her long imprisonment [as a Cominformist] was a testimonial to her firmness. She spared neither her children nor herself for a senseless and unjust cause, but one of which she was convinced." The reader may well question the strength of these feelings in the year 1948; and yet, judging by his subsequent behavior, it is evident that in Djilas' vast subconscious they occupied a great place. In terms of individuals he could not even bring himself to condemn a Cominformist.

The suppression of such intense feelings can only be justified in the light of the most fanatical commitment to an outside cause; and of this fanaticism there was ample evidence. Indeed, one of the most striking facts about Djilas' history as a Communist is that he remained loyal to his Party only when it was an essentially fanatical movement, and broke it when it ceased being one. A mere reformist movement could not have involved the kind of personal passion which justified the suppression of his basic human feelings.

Thus Djilas did not flinch in the period of the post-war political crackdown; nor did brutal collectivization cause him any evident uneasiness; nor the alliance with the USSR during the most harrowing years of the Cold War; nor the early attempts at imposing a strait-jacket on Yugoslav culture. Indeed, it was precisely his task to justify these measures, to stimulate more intensive Party activity, to rally young activists into the village for the task of collectivization, and to give direction to the all-powerful *agit-prop*, whose operations were his personal responsibility. In

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this semi-military period Djilas played a monumental role; and he remained immune to the childhood temptation to immerse himself again in the sensuousness and tenderness which he could express only as a writer.

In this respect Djilas was in marked contrast to the two other great figures thrown up by the 1953-56 anti-Stalinist rebellion: Wladyslaw Gomulka and Imre Nagy. Both had already distinguished themselves as anti-Stalinists well before they launched their memorable revolts; and in rebellion they were merely carrying their earlier political convictions to a logical conclusion. Djilas had no such record; there were no forewarnings; and this only reinforces our suspicion that his motives were primarily personal rather than political.

DJILAS' break came, then, only when the period of liberalization was ushered in: collectivization was halted; the police apparatus curtailed; workers' councils were organized; and a genuine literary life started again. Djilas played only a minor role in these complex reforms and burst to life again only to demand the complete destruction of the Communist state.

Djilas' return to the fundamental orientation of his childhood involves two distince developments: first, the loss of the sense of personal mission which accompanied the relaxation within Yugoslavia. Djilas was far more concerned with the stupefying complacency of the status quo than with the lack of democracy in the country's political life; far more upset by the loss of elan in the party's organization than by the lingering acts of brutality and caprice on the part of the regime; far more disturbed by the increasing personnel enjoyment of the historic party privileges than by the privileges *per se*. Democracy was for him a weapon in his personal struggle for liberation from the Party's growing stagnation, rather than evidence of a genuine respect for the rules of government by majority.

The second factor in Djilas' alienation concerns a more practical matter: at the time of his break with the Yugoslav Party Djilas was on the verge of losing his job. Not his titles, of course, but his basic political function. Djilas' special province had been culture, over which he had exercised enormous influence, backed up by the regime's huge repressive apparatus. The new policy of a relative *laissez-faire* in culture had inevitably reduced the scope of the cultural dictatorship he had fashioned for himself. Even more, the relaxation had minimized the need for the type of bold polemical exhortation which was his specialty, and in which he excelled above all his colleagues. What was needed was the close administrative reasoning and political cunning of which his associates Kardelj and Rankovic were acknowledged masters. This was a period of painful and difficult compromise: with the peasants, the workers, the intelligentsia, and with the major foreign powers. Except in rare instances, no broadsides against either Moscow or Washington were permitted; and the watchwords of the emerging neutralism were extreme caution and careful negotiation on the highest level. In the early 1950s Djilas had been offered a number of administrative posts, but he knew that this would mean his virtual extinction as a political figure. "They wanted to make me a civil servant," he scornfully explained later.

IN these circumstances it is little wonder that Djilas grew increasingly anxious about the fate of his revolution; no wonder that his mind began to cast about, seeking some means of restoring passion to the substance of his political life. In the process those early emotions —for the strange rites of a Turkish village and the warm embrace of childhood memories — would reassert themselves. But first, in retracing these memories, "moral obligations" made it mandatory that he try to rediscover these passions in the Party itself. And thus in late 1954 he issued his first clarion call for a resurrection of the long-dead comraderie of the wartime days:

> Once youth and torches; today they are impotent and extinct. . . . Even the old slogans sound unconvincing and gloomy. The revolution must find new ideas, new forms, a new style and language.

The slow process of administrative decentralization was no reality for him; only the "youth and torches" of an earlier day. And yet nothing could have been more remote from the Yugoslavia of the mid-1950s, where the constant liberalization and rising living standards, as well as the relative popularity of Tito's personal rule, had led so many to a gradual acceptance of present conditions, and at worst resignation to them. With some exceptions the main trend of youthful thought concentrated on jobs, education, advancement, a new refrigerator or electric stove. A small handful of Communists heeded Djilas' call; and of them only Dedijer, another writer, remained faithful.

BUT this was perhaps not unexpected. Djilas' drastic reorientation, and his bold manner of announcing it, was not calculated to arouse a political following or establish a political movement; in these things he no longer had any interest. A political change was not really what he sought; but rather a new human framework, and this could not come from a new political party. Djilas hailed the Hungarian revolution; but this was the "youth and torches" already in full blossom; no careful spadework to be done, no tiresome meetings to be attended; no membership lists to be sifted; only the full blaze of revolutionary glory. This glory had passed for him, and he was attending now to a far more important task: the reconstruction of his own personality.

This was the accomplishment of *Land Without Justice*, recording the slim mementos of real friendship, reviving the memories of genuine personal ambitions, rediscovering his deepest feelings. *The New Class* was written in fulfillment of a "moral obligation"; *Land Without Justice* was the beginning of a new life. "Everyone keeps coming back to what is the essence of his life," Djilas remarks in concluding an account of his father's many harebrained schemes for getting rich after his forced retirement from the army after World War I.

Hence the title of Djilas' new book is really misleading; it suggests a cheap moral evaluation the very absence of which is the book's highest virtue. Perhaps it is the publisher's title; let us hope so. If it was Djilas' own choice then one can only assume that he was referring not to Montenegro specifically, but to a larger allegorical quantity. Injustice is the fate of mankind, a fate which it would be madness to attempt to overcome. At best one can live according to one's innate principles, one's terrible

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but rich birthright, following one's erratic stars. That it will end badly is taken for granted; but that the human struggle itself is something wonderfully rich and enchanting need not be questioned. This conviction is Djilas' personal triumph, in spite of every adversity; and it is Yugoslavia's loss that its people cannot yet share this fundamental experience with their finest contemporary writer.

Crack-up in Japan

by James T. Farrell

THE BODY of Osamu Dazai was found in the Tamagawa Reservoir in Tokyo on what would have been his 39th birthday, in June, 1948. According to Donald Keene, his translator and an authority on Japanese literature, his "life of wild dissipation gave him much notoriety and caused even some unpopularity." Dazai was born in North Japan of a powerful land-owning family. He entered the French Department of Tokyo University in 1930, but boasted that he never attended a lecture. Because of a chronic chest ailment, he was exempted from military service during the war. He grew up absorbing much of Western culture and his characters reveal a familiarity with this culture, and even with some of its more superficial aspects. Dazai's novel, *The Setting Sun*, (also translated by Donald Keene and published by New Directions) was a sensation when it was published in Japan in 1947, and was considered to be an accurate depiction of life in post-war Japan. It is the story of a declining aristocratic family, focused through the eyes and experiences of a young woman, Kazuku, who believes that she and her kind are "victims of a transitional period in morality." In this novel, as in *No Longer Human*, Dazai clearly drew on his own experiences, but his writing is better described as his own testament and spiritual revelation of *malaise* than as strict autobiography.

No Longer Human, by Osamu Dazai, translated and with an Introduction by Donald Keene (New Directions, $3.50)

Both *The Setting Sun* and *No Longer Human* are remarkable and interesting novels, and they are beautifully translated by Donald Keene. Dazai and his work can be superficially compared with Mikhail Artzybashev. The suicide note which Artzybashev struck and even overemphasized in *The Breaking Point*, and the nihilism of *Sanine* were reflections in Tzarist Russia of moods which were used, and in part evoked, by the conflict of values and ideas which we see in the break-up of the East under the impact of the West, and in the personal conflict concerning values and purposes which the East-West dichotomy exposes, and even induces, in the mind of youth. But Dazai, who was not at all influenced by Artzybashev, is not likely to become lost and sunken in his own time as the Russian writer has been. Dazai was an artist who was giving expression to a virtual suicide script in these two novels.

No Longer Human (the literal translation, we are told, would read "disqualified from being human"), tells a story of "the buffoonery of defeat" by means of three notebooks left by a young madman named Yozo and a prologue and epilogue by the man who has discovered these notebooks. Yozo has presumably died. The madam of a Tokyo bar, Kyobashi, thought that Yozo "was a good boy, an angel," even though he drank. Yozo reveals how all his life he played the buffoon and amused people because he could not "even guess what it must be to live the life of a human being." He was determined not to fool himself, and he "could believe in hell, but it was impossible . . . to believe in the existence of heaven." He took to drink and prostitutes, in an unerring drift towards self-destruction. "I never could think of prostitutes as human beings or even as women," he wrote in one of his notebooks. A country boy becoming a "city-dweller personality," he lost all sense of values. Yozo is to be seen as a distinct individual and as an example of cultural transition. He is an over-sensitive individual, lost, doomed, in the rush of what we call progress and change.

No Longer Human is a moving and incisive novel, one which is actually "human, all-too-human." Osamu Dazai left us a fascinatingly told account of wounded human psyches. He was a writer of sharp, clear insight and skill. And no author could ask for a finer translator than Mr. Keene.

Imprisoned in the White House

by Richard L. Strout

THIS BOOK marks the end of an era in which it was bad form to criticize President Eisenhower. Almost as important as anything the book says is the fact that it appears at all. It is a serious, careful, not-unfriendly analysis of a President who declined, or was unable, to exercise the full office of the Presidency. That this event occurred at a time of deepening crisis is a misfortune. How great a misfortune we have yet to determine.

Eisenhower: Captive Hero, by Marquis Childs (Harcourt, Brace; $4.75).

This book is critical but it is not waspish. Eisenhower is presented as the extrovert he is with his love of the outdoors, his enjoyment of "Westerns," his courage in the face of sickness, his persistent optimism, his distrust of intellectualism, his identification with the tycoons. He became President because the GOP needed a front man, because he himself believed that good will and good motives could almost by themselves solve the nation's and the world's problems and because—far more than any thing else—the American people passionately demanded the creation of a father image on whom they could unload their political burdens.

"No President had ever had so little experience of politics and so little firsthand experience of American life," Childs observes. After all, General Grant spent seven years as farmer and store clerk. Save for two years as president of Columbia, Eisenhower had no civilian

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experience at all during his adult life.

And so the Hero came to the Presidency with a copy-book notion of the job, a belief that he could unite the nation by good-will, and a determination to act as a sort of Chairman of the Board.

No other President ever delegated so many powers. At his press conferences, Childs notes, he often displayed a curious, disturbing detachment, a kind of "withdrawal," as though he were standing to one side looking on. The press in the first term almost universally lauded him. To adopt a tone short of veneration, awe even, was considered bad form. For four years it worked pretty well. Right up to that gloomy Suez crisis at the 1956 election day itself there was "peace and prosperity."

Then quite suddenly came budget troubles, Little Rock and Sputnik. The nation rubbed its eyes to discover that in a fit of absentmindedness it had lost missile supremacy to the once-despised Russians. Childs does not write stridently, his tone is quiet and subdued. It is not quite journalism, it is not quite history, it is a blend of the two. He has a keen sense of the extraordinary drama between the surface smoothness of events and the real story. The "popular image" had been of a strong man sweeping all before him; the reality was, as Childs interprets it, of a man with an "indifferent and hesitant approach" and an unrealistic concept of his job.

"For his failure to use the powers of the office, Eisenhower, in the interpretation of weak and strong," Childs observes, "must be put down as a weak President."

Childs does not offer this bitterly, as an indictment; he writes matter-of-factly. Indeed the same estimate has already gained acceptance among a section of the press in Washington (as contrasted to their editors) who have waited for the public to catch up with it. After all, is it Eisenhower's fault that he did not come up to an impossible image which others created of him, while the American people, "romantically, impetuously, frivolously almost, invested so much of the future in a dream of the past"?

Childs does not lecture the American public. But he does conclude his book with a reminder of another President, Buchanan, exactly 100 years ago. He was a weak President all right and it was a national disaster that he came to office and evaded and procrastinated just at a time of supreme crisis. "It was not that President Buchanan did anything bad," Childs observes acerbly. "He simply did nothing."

Whoever follows Eisenhower, Childs concludes with studied matter-of-factness, "will have to reassert the authority that has been permitted to decline."

The Tennessee Monkey Trial

by Charles Forcey

IN HIS brilliant account of the Tennessee "monkey trial" of 1925, Mr. Ginger gives us a book where history not only records the events of a time but illuminates their significance for all time. Though he has not documented his story, both his concluding note on sources and his scrupulous reasoning suggest a thorough command of the evidence. With charm and remarkable brevity, he recounts the origins of the Tennessee anti-evolution statute, paints revealing portraits of the fundamentalist Bryan and the agnostic Darrow, and then dramatically traces the story of the Dayton trial to its oddly ambiguous conclusion. In the course of his tale, Ginger casts light on many questions heretofore obscure — the considerable debt the whole spectacle owed to the commercial dreams of Dayton merchants, the role of the American Civil Liberties Union in the controversy, and, most trenchantly of all, the probable motives and calculations of prosecution, court, and defense.

Six Days or Forever?; Tennessee v. John Thomas Scopes, by Ray Ginger (Beacon; $3.95).

At times Ginger's readable style becomes so sparse and colloquial as to belie the warmly humanistic culture otherwise evident. Also, paradoxically, he occasionally uses awkward and archaic words ("amniotic," "frore," "lallation," and "fleered"). At one point, too, in a book otherwise notably consistent, he appears to contradict himself. When summarizing the aftermath of the Scopes trial, Ginger attacks a contemporary editorial (as it happens from this journal) that criticized the defense's desire for judicial review of the anti-evolution law, yet in his own conclusions he argues that the courts should not decide such vital questions of policy as those that divided fundamentalists and evolutionists in the twenties.

THESE minor flaws, however, in no way obscure the book's real merit. Ginger is unwilling to dismiss the buffoonery of Bryan and the Tennessee yokels with a Mencken-like sneer. While he has little real sympathy for the fundamentalists, Ginger centers his whole book around the idea that the open-eyed skepticism of Darrow was as myopic in many respects as the blind fanaticism of the Great Commoner. He feels that Bryan as the fundamentalists' messiah had his finger upon such enduring human problems as the need of man for communal ritual, or the historical (Bryan said universal) reliance of ethics upon religion, or the difficulty (Bryan said impossibility) of sustaining revealed religion if revelation be challenged. Ginger demonstrates, however, that Bryan's own ignorance, his fatal belief in absolute majority rule, his arrogance, and his ambition foredoomed both himself and his cause to the ultimate humiliation at Dayton.

Ginger finds much more to like in Clarence Darrow—his intelligence, his reverence for truth, his humor, and his awareness of all the human imponderables. Yet Darrow emerges hardly more a hero than Bryan. Ginger feels that the great defense lawyer's skepticism had by 1925 become self-defeating, that his fatalistic reliance on majority rule was nearly as uncritical as Bryan's, and that his denial of free will left almost as little hope for science and human creativity as did fundamentalist bigotry.

Notes on Contributors

PAUL WILLEN is an expert on Eastern European affairs. JAMES T. FARRELL is the distinguished American novelist. RICHARD L. STROUT is a veteran Washington correspondent. CHARLES FORCEY is on the history faculty of Columbia University.

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ART

Up In Central Park

TWENTY-ODD years ago — and they have been odd years — Salvador Dali was in his most fertile period as an experimental social scientist. Among his unrecognized contributions to human comfort was an object made of pottery and designed to be shattered against a wall in a fit of temper, thus reducing the homocide, suicide, and divorce rates, as well as relaxing international tensions. Ever since the departure for Worcester of the late Francis Henry Taylor, the Metropolitan Museum has served the same purpose among museum men, art writers and artists. Whenever the conversation lagged or a deadline approached, it has been as if an interior voice suggested, "Well, let's beat up the Met for a while."

To be sure, there have been reasons, or at least good excuses. The general antagonism goes back to Taylor's resignation, which apparently caught the trustees completely offguard, much as did Daniel Catton Rich's recent decision to leave Chicago and succeed Taylor at Worcester. For several months one or another of the Met's trustees would turn up at various museums around the country, look, listen, say nothing and return to New York. As seen from the outside, the process resembled nothing so much as the search for the reincarnated Dalai Lama formerly conducted by the Tibetan Hierarchy on the death of the old Lama. The mere fact of the search set into motion a round of musical chairs among museum directors and curators; the game is still in progress, with people rather than chairs disappearing each time the music stops. The general edginess inevitably produced by all this was aggravated when the trustees ended their talent hunt right in their own back yard, taking James R. Rorimer out of the Cloisters and putting him in charge of the whole show.

Events since then haven't helped matters. The difference in style between the two directors is immense. For one thing, Taylor *had* style and at times seemed to be cultivating it deliberately. Apparently just as deliberately, Rorimer shuns any action, any exhibition, any statement, that might seem to stem from personal flair. In Taylor, the combination of the man and the job produced something related to Dr. Johnson. It was not so much that Taylor's word was law as that his word was there. In everything he did, it was clear that he loved art passionately, had an opinion on everything connected with it and was ready to fight, if need be, to advance what he loved. The impression Rorimer gives is of the man who minds the store.

Well, if the store is the Metropolitan Museum of Art, it takes some minding. Since his succession, Rorimer has been engaged in a mammoth overhauling of the collections and the galleries. The process is well enough long now to show that the new Met is going to be quite something. Accessioning — that lovely word that sounds like legal piracy and sometimes is—has continued, has indeed been brilliant, keeping out of the fashionable and inflated areas and turning up some extraordinary additions.

Special exhibitions, a strong point of Taylor's, have been a weak point of Rorimer's and his prior announcement that he was going to play them down in favor of the permanent collections hasn't influenced anyone to refrain from howling every time a special event does take place at the Met. You can't blame the howlers. I've howled myself once or twice and may again. In the absence of anything else, these events take on the appearance of major exhibitions at the Metropolitan and in that context some of them look pretty funny. There was, for example, *Life* magazine's collection of full size transparencies of 100 great pictures, looking like masterpieces of the embalmer's art with the light coming through instead of reflecting off the surfaces. There was the Churchill retrospective complete with the unfortunate image of the director counting heads and rubbing his hands. And, most recently, there was the acceptance of "September Morn," conveniently hung near the door so that he who runs might grab a peek at the Comstock Load and get right back on the Fifth Avenue bus.

These events give the impression of an opera company that suddenly began playing "The Student Prince" or "South Pacific" in order to make expenses and this is the line that has been followed in most of the comment. Yet the impression is manifestly false and the superb work being done on the permanent collections is enough to show it.

TAYLOR and a surprising number of the top museum men of his generation had, almost as a gift of nature, the peculiar combination of scholarship and showmanship that has produced the 20th Century flowering of the art museum in America. In the upcoming crop, the stress is on scholarship and sobriety. The new men are aware of the popular touch the old masters had and either condemn it, try to manufacture it or do both at once.

A fairer picture of special exhibitions at the Met is afforded by those just closing after the summer run. The "Amazons on Greek Vases" didn't really add much to anyone's knowledge of those early maedchen in uniform and I don't know whether it got the "September Morn" crowd back to the museum—if it did they were disappointed—but the show did have a lot of beautiful black and red pots beautifully displayed.

In the center ring was the annual summer loan show built on the mutual convenience of the museum and of New York collectors away for the summer. There was a lot of the fashionable French, including the top-dollar Goulandris Gauguin and a monster Monet "Water Lilies" from Walter P. Chrysler, Jr. But the foundation was solid and much of it from the Stephen C. Clark collection: Cezanne's "Card Players," Van Gogh's "Night Cafe," Seurat's "Parade," portraits by Hals and Rembrandt and some choice American work.

A small gallery of prints by Callot and Daumier showed that Callot's eye was very cold indeed and that the heat of political commitment, in Daumier, can intensify even the coldness of a printman's eye.

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Correspondence

(Continued from page 3)

since I am supposed to be involved in the argument, let me make these remarks:

1) A love of democracy and a hatred of totalitarianism are not enough to define the point of view of Mary McCarthy. These things she shares with too many other persons who differ from her radically in other respects.

2) The choice of the Byron symbol—like that of the Catiline symbol and the symbol of the Cold Eye—was the act of Miss McCarthy. I assume that she usually knows what she is doing. If Mr. Ross finds something invidious here, he will have to take it up with her, not with me.

3) As for my views on sex—if Mr. Ross cares to look at the first two "digressions" in my *Decline and Fall of Sex,* he will find my positive affirmations in the analyses of Shakespeare's *Romeo and Juliet* and of Bédier's *Tristam and Iseult.* Whenever Mr. Ross can prove that these two documents are "middle class" and "puritanized", then I'll have to admit that he's got me too.

4) The belief in God and immortality is hardly to be dismissed as a "denominational" prejudice any more than is the belief in Miss McCarthy's particular brand of humanism. Both sets of beliefs are classical in our culture. Nor do they exclude the possibility of communication and of cooperation with one another.

Nowhere do I "sneer" at anything in Miss McCarthy. I was quite sincere in complimenting her on the justness of her judgments in theology. In any case I continue to value her lucid and penetrating intelligence, the purity and elegance of her style, and the sharpness of her satire. The main concern of my critical essay was to inquire into her convictions about human nature and about human values; and my only hope is that the vision of life which she has may develop so as to enhance rather than to diminish her obvious talents.

ROBERT E. FITCH
Pacific School of Religion
Berkeley, California

► *Causes of World War I*

SIRS:

YOU recently pointed out the fact that *The New Republic* in 1919 and early 1920 printed several articles by John Maynard Keynes attacking the reparations clauses of the Versailles Treaty and also editorials denouncing the myth of Germany's sole responsibility for causing World War I. As a result, your magazine was accused of being pro-German and its circulation fell off 40 percent.

I believe that the publication of this "revisionist" point of view was a very real service to the accurate appraisal of the historic facts. *NR* can take pride in being one of the first magazines to present the opinion—then so unpopular but since confirmed by much historical research—that the real responsibility for World War I had to be shared in varying degrees by all the Great Powers of Europe.

At the same time, however, I think it is useful to reflect a bit on the ways in which unscrupulous German publicists in the 1920's pounced on this verdict of "mixed responsibility" and used it both to attack the allies and to undermine the authority of the Weimar government which had signed the Versailles Peace Treaty. For example, one of the central themes of Hitler's speeches during this period was the demand that Germany's honor be restored by a flat denunciation of the "infamous war-guilt clause." And in order to support his charges against the allies, he frequently drew upon some of the more superficial, self-critical arguments of "revisionary" historians in France, England and the United States. Eventually, Hitler even took up the claim that it was the allies themselves that shared the "sole responsibility" for causing the war.

Heedless recrimination after a great conflict has obviously never benefited either the victor or the vanquished, and many people today—including Mr. John Foster Dulles who played a part in the drafting of the reparations and "war guilt" clauses—believe that grave errors were written into the Versailles Peace Treaty. But on the other hand, it seems undeniable that the conscientious attempts at rectification of these errors by "revisionists" were quickly distorted by a dictator who used truth just as easily as lies to promote his own totalitarian ends. Perhaps the lesson we could learn from the fate of the "war-guilt" myth in pre-Nazi Germany is that initial injustices in our execution of international affairs have a way of compounding themselves in later events and that the task of reestablishing a once-sullied justice is increasingly perilous in an increasingly complex world.

RICHARD M. HUNT

Cambridge, Mass.

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"Of the many authors and authorities in the field of sexual relationships, Dr. Ellis is perhaps not so profound or technical as some others, and in this lies his great strength, because he certainly is not lacking in experience.

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